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I. INTRODUCTION
Employer-sponsored health care costs are out of control. Since
the mid-seventies, the cost of providing medical benefits to employ-
ees has increased well above inflation in medical care costs.' In 1988
alone, medical care costs per employee rose to an annual average of
$2354, an 18.6% increase over 1987.2 Citing cost containment as
the number one health benefit concern, employers have searched for
creative and more economical means of providing medical benefits. 3
Self-funded health insurance plans have provided one method for
employers to decrease health care benefit costs.4 Compared to true
insurance plans, 5 self-funded plans afford employers greater latitude
and control over their employee benefit plans. 6 Several options exist
for employers who choose to self-fund their employee benefit plans.
Under a purely self-funded (also called self-insured) plan, the em-
ployer assumes 100% of the risk for benefits provided and does not
contract with any other entity to limit its liability.7
Additionally, the employer may choose to partially self-fund its
employee benefit plan and to purchase excess stop-loss insurance. 8
"Under this arrangement, the employer customarily accepts liability
1. David A. Beech, Contemporary Design Consideration, in SELF INSURANCE: THE
HEALTH CARE ALTERNATIVE § IV, at 8 (Minn. Inst. of Legal Educ., 1989).
2. William P. Brady, Funding Arrangements and Excess Stop-Loss Insurance for Self-
Funded Health Plans, in SELF INSURANCE supra note 1, § VI, at 3. Although these costs
have been increasing since the mid-1970s, the 1988 cost increase was unprecedented.
Id.
3. Beech, supra note 1, at 4-6.
4. Brady, supra note 2, at 3-4.
5. Under a true insurance plan, i.e., one which is fully-insured, an employer
purchases an employee welfare plan from an insurance company and pays a set pre-
mium per employee per month. Under this contract, the employer assumes no risk
and is only responsible for the premium payment to the insurance company. Ap-
proximately 20% of the market remains fully-insured. Brady, supra note 2, at 6.
6. Brady, supra note 2, at 4.
7. Id. at 7.
8. Id. at 7. An employer may purchase stop-loss insurance coverage from a
state-regulated insurance company to minimize the dollar amount of claims the em-
ployer will pay. For example, an employer may decide to self-insure the risk of pay-
ing claims, either on an individual employee basis or in an aggregate amount, up to a
certain amount. Once the employer has paid out claims up to this amount, the insur-
[Vol. 18
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for payment of all health plan costs and, in turn, contracts with an
insurance company for excess stop-loss coverage to minimize its ex-
posure to unlimited benefits liability."9
Finally, employers who self-fund their benefits generally hire
"third party administrators" (TPAs) for the sole purpose of adminis-
tration and payment of benefits. The average cost of administration
by a TPA is 4.7% of paid claims.0
As a result of their special nature, self-funded employee benefit
plans cannot be reached by state insurance regulatory schemes. In-
stead, via the preemption clausel and the deemer clausel 2 of the
ance company, with which the employer has contracted, assumes responsibility for
additional claims under the plan. Id.
A majority of appellate courts hold that the purchase of stop-loss insurance cov-
erage by a self-funded employee benefit plan does not destroy the plan's self-funded
nature. See Insurance Bd. Under Social Ins. Plan of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir,
819 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1987); Moore v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d
922 (9th Cir. 1986); see also United Food & Commercial Workers v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1986). In Pacyga, the Ninth Circuit explained why the purchase of
stop-loss insurance coverage does not destroy a plan's self-funded nature:
[S]top-loss insurance cannot be termed health insurance, nor can it be said
that the Plan is providing an insurance contract to its participants. The
stop-loss coverage provides for payment to the Plan . . .to reimburse the
Plan in the event that it must pay out more than a certain amount in claims
in a given year. The stop-loss insurance does not pay benefits directly to
participants, nor does the insurance company take over administration of
the Plan at the point when the aggregate amount is reached. Thus, no in-
surance is provided to the participants, and the Plan should properly be
termed a non-insured plan ....
Id. at 1161-62. Contra Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v.
Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that state-mandated benefit laws
apply to self-funded employee benefit plans where the plan has purchased stop-loss
coverage), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986).
9. Brady, supra note 2, at 7. Courts have generally held that this arrangement
does not change the benefit plan's self-funded status, even though the plan has dis-
tributed a portion of its risk to an insurance company. See supra note 8.
10. Brady, supra note 2, at 8.
11. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 514(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (preemption clause). "Except as provided in subsection (b)
of this section [the savings clause], the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter
III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... Id.
12. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988) (deemer clause).
Neither an employee benefit plan.., nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies,
or investment companies.
Id.
Appellate courts have noted that the deemer clause protects ERISA plans from
being "deemed" insurers or in the business of insurance by a state solely to get the
plan to fall under the state's insurance regulation. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
19921
3
Swedback: The Deemer Clause: A Legislative Savior for Self-funded Health In
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1992
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),'3 fed-
eral law regulates self-funded employee benefit plans. Hence, self-
funded employee benefit plans do not pay state premium tax, do not
have to comply with state mandated minimum coverage require-
ments, and do not have to keep state mandated reserves.'
4
Given these unique advantages, approximately 35% of all Minne-
sota employers have chosen to offer medical benefits to their em-
ployees through self-funded plans.15  Although self-funded
employee benefit plans are not adaptable to meet every employer's
needs,16 statistics demonstrate that employers are turning to self-
funded plans at an increasing rate.'
7
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (drawing, in dicta, a distinction in regulation
between self-funded and funded insurance benefit plans); see also FMC Corp. v. Hol-
liday, 11l S. Ct. 403 (1990) (importing dicta from Metropolitan Life). But see Northern
Group Servs., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that
the proper inquiry regarding the application of the deemer clause to self-funded
plans should be determined on case-by-case basis as to whether the state regulation
involved affects a central concern of ERISA which Congress sought to protect).
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
14. David R. Strand et al., Legal Consideration for Self-Insured Health Care Plans, in
SELF INSURANCE supra note 1, § V, at 43-47; see also Thomas J. Butters, Comment,
State Regulation of Noninsured Employee Welfare Benefit Plans, 62 GEO. L.J. 339, 353 (1973)
(noting that requiring self-insured plans to comply with state regulations effectively
diminishes any economic benefit an employer receives though self-funding).
15. Strand, supra note 14, at 45.
16. See Douglas C. Grabham, Choosing to Self-Insure: Issues for Employers to Consider,
in SELF INSURANCE supra note 1, § I. Grabham states, "a general rule of thumb indi-
cates that employers should not self-fund medical benefits if the group of employees
under the plan is small [under 300] or contains a large percentage of high utilizers of
health care-such as retirees." Id. at 7.
17. Percentage of employers with self-funded plans in 1990 statistics (1989 statis-
tics are enclosed in parentheses):
Self-funded Self-funded
with without Self-funded
stop-loss stop-loss total
All responding employers: 43% (35%) 17% (17%) 59% (52%)
Responding employers, by region:
Pacific 40% (33%) 11% (14%) 52% (47%)
Mountain 45% (43%) 20% (14%) 64% (57%)
North Central 47% (40%) 19% (19%) 66% (59%)
South Central 51% (39%) 23% (25%) 74% (64%)
New England 46% (29%) 16% (15%) 62% (44%)
Mid-Atlantic 27% (23%) 17% (18%) 43% (41%)
South Atlantic 48% (39%) 12% (12%) 59% (51%)
A. FOSTER HIGGINS & CO., INC., FOSTER HIGGINS HEALTH CARE BENEFITS SURVEY 33
(1990); A. FOSTER HIGGINS & Co., INC., FOSTER HIGGINS HEALTH CARE BENEFITS SUR-
VEY 44 (1991).
From 1982 through 1986, the percentage of large employers (over 1000 employ-
ees) who self-funded their employee benefit plans increased from 43% to 67%.
Brady, supra note 2, at 1.
[Vol. 18
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This Note will discuss the scope of ERISA's preemption and
deemer clauses with regard to interpretations made by both the fed-
eral and state courts vis-A-vis self-funded health benefit plans. The
anomalous distinction drawn by the courts in interpreting ERISA's
effect on self-funded, versus fully-insured, plans leads not only to
disparate treatment of plan beneficiaries but also subverts Congress'
original intent in enacting ERISA. Additionally, this Note will sug-
gest alternative measures that courts could use to ensure uniformity
and equity for employee benefit plans.
II. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974
In 1974, under the Ford Administration, Congress enacted the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act' 8 to create uniformity
and to control abuses in pension and benefit plans.19 Previous at-
tempts, through state and federal regulation, were inadequate in
preventing abuses in the pension and benefit area.20 ERISA's draft-
18. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988)).
19. In the introduction to the statute, Congress defined the policy goals of
ERISA:
[T]he policy of [ERISA is] to protect interstate commerce and the interests
of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requir-
ing the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial
and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of
conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit
plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready ac-
cess to the Federal courts.
ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
Further, Congress designed ERISA legislation to
protect interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of
participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving
the equitable character and the soundness of such plans by requiring them
to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service,
to meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination
insurance.
ERISA § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1988).
Finally, Congress underscored the necessity of ERISA legislation by emphasizing
that the "growth in size, scope, and numbers of employee benefit plans in recent
years has been rapid and substantial," as well as noting "that the operational scope
and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate ...." ERISA § 2(a), 29
U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1988).
20. Initially Congress had attempted to control the abuses occurring in employee
benefit plans through tax regulation. See I.R.C. § 401(a) (1982) (repealed 1986).
Under section 401(a), Congress designated "qualified plans" which allowed employ-
ers to take an immediate deduction for contributions and allowed plan participants to
defer taxation until the plan's proceeds were actually received. James D. Hutchinson
& David M. Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law Under the Employee Retirement Income Act
of 1974, 46 U. CHi. L. REV. 23, 27 (1978). Section 40 1(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code required that a qualified plan be "intended for the exclusive benefit of employ-
ees and their beneficiaries, it may not discriminate in favor of shareholders, officers
or highly compensated employees, it must cover a minimum percentage of all em-
1992]
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ers thus focused on carving out an area of "exclusive federal
concern."21
A. Structure of ERISA
The Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury
have joint jurisdiction over employee benefit plans. 22 To make this
area one of "exclusive federal concern," Title I of ERISA establishes
"substantive regulatory standards governing employee benefit plans
covered by the Act."23 Further, Congress divided Title I into five
parts: Part One defines reporting and disclosure requirements for
both pensions and welfare benefit plans.24 Part Two "creates mini-
mum vesting standards and strict participation requirements for em-
ployee pension benefit plans." 25 Part Three contains funding
requirements for employee pension plans.2 6 Part Four details "fidu-
ciary standards for the management of employee pension and wel-
fare benefit funds."2 7 Part Five regulates the "administration and
enforcement provision of ERISA which applies to both employee
ployees, and it must meet minimum vesting and termination rules." Id. at 26-27. But
see Lawrence Allen Vranka, Jr., Comment, Defining the Contours of ERISA Preemption of
State Insurance Regulation: Making Employee Benefit Plan Regulation an Exclusively Federal
Concern, 42 VAND. L. REV. 607, 611 (1989) (provisions of section 401(a) "could be
avoided by employers who could afford to forego the tax benefits of a 'qualified'
plan.").
Additionally, through the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Congress
attempted to regulate employee benefit plans by prohibiting employers from paying
money "to a union or employee trust, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the em-
ployees of such employer ... " Id. at 611 n.19 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988)).
In 1958, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act to re-
quire compulsory disclosure and filing duties aimed at controlling the "diversion of
funds by speculation, overly generous commissions to favored companies (some in
collusion with plan administrators), and other such questionable activities." M. BER-
STEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 47-48 (1964). Because of limitations placed
on the bill by the House, effective disclosure methods were difficult to achieve. Aside
from an amendment regarding criminal penalties to the law in 1961, the Act "did not
prescribe proper plan practices or provisions to enhance the effectiveness of plans."
Id.
Interestingly, much of the state and federal legislation that had attempted, but
failed, to control abuses pre-ERISA, served as a basis for the codification of ERISA to
create one uniform act.
21. See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981); see also
supra note 19 for a description of Congress' policy goals of ERISA.
22. David J. Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ER-
ISA, 62 IOWA L. REV. 57, 60 (1976).
23. Id. at 61.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 62.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 63.
[Vol. 18
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pension and welfare benefit plans."28 From the perspective of state
insurance regulators, Part Five of Title I, specifically section 514, has
presented the most interpretative problems.
B. Structure of Section 514
To enforce the goals of ERISA, the drafters developed a three-step
process to determine the impact of ERISA on state laws. First, the
drafters constructed a broad preemption clause stating, "Except as
provided in subsection (b) of this section [the savings clause], the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall
supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan .... "29 Thus, "ERISA involved
not only the creation of new law but also the displacement of a large
body of existing state law."30 During the House and Senate debate,
ERISA's drafters clearly contemplated that federal courts would de-
velop a body of federal common law to replace the state common law
remedies that fell outside of traditional state insurance regulation.St
28. Id. Congress defined an employee welfare benefit plan as follows:
[Any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter estab-
lished or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by
both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is
maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their benefi-
ciaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgi-
cal, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident,
disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or
other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid
legal services, or (B) any benefit described in section 186(c) of this title
(other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such
pensions).
ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1988).
29. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Representative John H. Dent,
House sponsor of ERISA, heralded the breadth of the preemption clause as the stat-
ute's "crowning achievement." 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974).
Prior to the passage of the bill, both House and Senate had disagreed as to the
expansiveness of the preemptive reach. "Initially, both the House and Senate ver-
sions of the bill preempted only those state laws concerning ERISA's 'fiduciary, re-
porting and disclosure responsibilities' or relating to 'the subject matter' it was to
regulate. Both versions also contained a savings clause for state insurance regula-
tion, but neither contained any deemer provision." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d
79, 87 (3d Cir. 1989). The final bill, as adopted, contained a much broader scope of
preemption than originally considered. Senator Javits explained this change: "The
change sprang from the concern that the more specific formulation 'raised the possi-
bility of endless litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on
Federal regulation,' and a desire to err on the side of Federal uniformity." Id. (citing
120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974)).
30. Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 20, at 34.
31. SenatorJavits, one of ERISA's main sponsors remarked: "It is also intended
that a body of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with
issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."
120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974).
1992]
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Subsequent case history has demonstrated that courts have not ful-
filled Congress' expectation.32
32. The reality of this expectation is still doubtful 18 years after the passage of
the bill. In 1987, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged Congress' spe-
cious expectation:
Over the years states ...have developed a substantial and complex
body of common law and statutory principles to resolve questions of priority
that arise when multiple coverage produces conflicts of the type presented
in this case [i.e. a state law requiring coordination of benefits in Michigan's
No-Fault Automobile Insurance Act]. This corpus of law embodies princi-
ples of restitution and risk allocation that have evolved from acquired state
experience and expertise. Although these rules may be imperfect and dis-
play some minor variation from state to state, in the aggregate they none-
theless represent an interconnected and complex network of generally
applicable laws with which the nation's insurers have grown familiar.
... In the absence of any particular federal interest in uniformity that
would inform the development of federal common law on this issue, what
federal common law we might develop surely would mostly parrot the prin-
ciples already developed by the state courts. Moreover, application of a fed-
eral rule of common law here would trigger a substantial risk of
"disrupt[ing] commercial relationships predicated on state law."
Northern Group Servs. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 94 (6th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted).
ERISA's civil enforcement provision provides a good example of the absurdity
which results from the lack of federal common law. Although ERISA purports to
contain an exclusive civil enforcement remedy provision, an anomalous result arises
when federal courts must resort to state law in the absence of an ERISA remedy.
ERISA's sole civil enforcement provision arises under section 502(a):
[A] plan participant or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the
plan, to enforce the participant's rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to
future benefits. Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a declara-
tory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction against a plan
administrator's improper refusal to pay benefits. A participant or benefici-
ary may also bring a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, and under
this cause of action may seek removal of the fiduciary. In an action under
these civil enforcement provisions, the court in its discretion may allow an
award of attorney's fees to either party.
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 53 (1987) (citation omitted).
Federal courts find themselves in a conundrum when faced with a legal issue for
which ERISA provides no remedy. In the absence of an ERISA remedy, federal
courts may turn to the most analogous state statute for guidance. However, the char-
acterization of the plaintiff's claim is a question of federal law. See, e.g., Johnson v.
State Mut. Life Assurance Co., 942 F.2d 1260, 1262 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985)).
In Johnson, nearly 10 years after her husband's death, plaintiff brought suit
against an insurance company alleging breach of contract for failure to pay accidental
death benefits. The insurance company argued that, because the proceeds were pay-
able from an ERISA benefit plan, plaintiff's action should be one for breach of trust.
In Missouri, the statute of limitations for breach of contract is 10 years and for breach
of trust is five years. ERISA also contains a statute of limitations for actions alleging
a breach of trust under an ERISA plan. See ERISA § 413, 29 U.S.C. § 1113 (1988).
However, this action is limited to suits "claiming breach of an ERISA trustee's fiduci-
ary duties." Johnson, 942 F.2d at 1262.
The court found that borrowing the state statute of limitations for breach of trust
proffered a paradoxical result: "It cannot be consistent with congressional intent to
[Vol. 18
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Second, to mitigate the harsh impact of the preemption clause on
the displacement of state power, ERISA's drafters included a "sav-
ings clause," which returned to the states the power to regulate
traditional areas of commerce-insurance, banking, and securities.33
State law that regulates these three areas is thus "saved" from the
broad sweep of ERISA's preemption clause.
Third, the drafters modified the scope of ERISA's savings clause
through the "deemer clause."3 4 The deemer clause qualifies the sav-
ings clause by providing that an employee benefit plan cannot be
deemed an insurance company solely for the purpose of a state law
which "purport[s] to regulate insurance companies, insurance con-
tracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies."35
Those responsible for interpreting ERISA's deemer clause have
found a mire of poor legislative drafting.3 6 Emerging from this en-
tanglement of clauses, however, the United States Supreme Court
has attempted to establish uniformity.3 7 Lower courts have inter-
preted the Court's position to be that ERISA, because of the deemer
borrow a state breach-of-trust statute of limitations to govern suits by ERISA benefi-
ciaries, when that state statute was itself preempted by an ERISA limitations provi-
sion that is expressly not applicable to such suits." Id. See also Todd M. Worscheck,
Comment, Eighth Circuit Struggles to Select Appropriate Statute of Limitations for ERISA
Claims: Difficulties With a Straightforward Matter?-Johnson v. State Mutual Life Assurance
Co. of America, 18 WM. MrCHELL L. REV. 861 (1992).
33. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988) (savings clause).
ERISA's savings clause reads: "Except as provided in subparagraph (B) [the deemer
clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any per-
son from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id.
Great confusion has arisen from the inclusion of the savings clause into ERISA.
On one hand, Congress declared the regulation of employee benefit plans an "exclu-
sive federal concern." Then, in the same breath, Congress returned to the states, by
way of the savings clause, a large portion of that control through insurance regula-
tion. "[W]hile the general pre-emption clause broadly pre-empts state law, the sav-
ing clause appears broadly to preserve the States' lawmaking power over much of the
same regulation. While Congress occasionally decides to return to the States what it
has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the same time." Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985).
34. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988) (deemer clause); see
also supra note 12.
35. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988); see also supra note
12.
36. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739 (noting that the preemption and deemer
clauses of ERISA, "while clear enough on their faces, perhaps are not a model of
legislative drafting").
37. In Metropolitan Life, the United States Supreme Court recognized that "our
decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the
former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. By so doing we merely
give life to a distinction created by Congress in the 'deemer clause,' a distinction
Congress is aware of and one it has chosen not to alter." Id. at 747; see also FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, I11 S. Ct. 403, 411 (1990). In FMC Corp., the Court reversed the
Third Circuit, holding a state anti-subrogation law was preempted by ERISA with
1992]
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clause, allows a distinction "between true insurance companies,
which are subject to state law, and employee benefit plans, which are
exempt from state regulation even though they exhibit some of the same
risk-distributing characteristics as traditional insurance."38 Because of this
distinction, ERISA plan beneficiaries "insured" through their em-
ployer's self-funded benefit plan may not receive the same privileges
or protections afforded through a true insurance plan governed by
state regulation.3 9
Much of the litigation involving ERISA stems from the distinction
drawn between self-funded and fully-insured plans.40 Those plain-
regards to a self-funded employee benefit plan subrogation claim. In dissent, how-
ever, Justice Stevens argued strenuously that the majority's decision
draws a broad and illogical distinction between benefit plans that are funded
by the employer (self-insured plans) and those that are insured by regulated
insurance companies.... From the standpoint of the beneficiaries of ERISA
plans-who after all are the primary beneficiaries of the entire statutory pro-
gram-there is no apparent reason for treating self-insured plans differently
from insured plans.
Id. at 411 (Stevens, J. dissenting); see also infra note 105 and accompanying text.
38. Eversole v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 500 F. Supp. 1162, 1169 (C.D. Cal.
1980) (emphasis added).
39. The most significant disadvantage for a self-insured plan participant centers
on the employer's financial solvency. ERISA's regulatory scheme does not provide
adequate guidelines to secure a plan's financial solidity. State regulators have voiced
two concerns regarding the absence of funding guidelines for self-funded employee
benefit plans: "The first is the possibility that inadequate amounts of money will be
set aside to pay benefit claims. The second is the danger that plan managers will use
benefit monies as operating capital." Brummond, supra note 22, at 117 n.474 (cita-
tions omitted).
Self-funded plan participants may also not benefit from state mandated coverage
laws because the employer may decide not to include a mandated coverage in its
employee benefit plan. Thus protective measures required by the states may not
reach self-funded plan participants. See id. at 84 (noting many state insurance depart-
ments have specified benefit laws which have upgraded the quality of employee bene-
fit plans). ERISA, however, prevents these state schemes from reaching self-funded
employee benefit plans.
Finally, self-funded plans cannot be required to contribute to Minnesota's Com-
prehensive Health Association (MCHA). See St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v.
Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931, 932 (D. Minn. 1980); see also infra notes 151-161 and
accompanying text. Enacted in 1976, MCHA created a fund to insure persons who
have chronic medical conditions and are unable to obtain medical insurance. See
MINN. STAT. § 62E.10 (1990). All insurance companies and health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMOs) are contributing members to MCHA and share in MCHA's annual
losses. Id. § 62E.10, subd. 5. Inequities arise because self-funded plans do not con-
tribute, even though a self-funded plan's participants may be eligible to receive bene-
fits under MCHA. See id. § 62E.14, subds. (c), (d).
40. The United States Supreme Court's holdings have clearly categorized the po-
lar extremes. At one end is the purely self-funded employee benefit plan which must
only comply with the mandates of ERISA law. At the opposite end is the employee
benefit plan which purchases a fully-insured group health insurance plan through an
insurance company and is thus indirectly regulated by the state. See Metropolitan Life,
471 U.S. at 747 (distinguishing between federal regulation of self-funded plans and
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tiffs that have dared to enter the thicket of ERISA's preemption
clause have found little but confusion within the courts.
III. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S HANDLING OF SELF-FUNDED
ERISA QUESTIONS
Historically, the seminal purpose behind ERISA legislation was to
eradicate abuses within the pension plan area.4 1 Yet, given the scant
legislative history specifically addressing employee benefit plans, in
contrast with the voluminous legislative history addressing pension
plans, the inclusion of employee benefit plans into ERISA appears to
have been a congressional afterthought.42 Due to this lack of con-
gressional guidance, courts have had to rely not only on fundamental
preemption principles4S but also on their interpretation of statutory
state regulation of insurance companies which provide insurance contracts to em-
ployee benefit plans).
The Court's most recent opinion purported to resolve the conflict between self-
funded and insured plans once and for all. FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 403. However,
the Court's opinion in FMC Corp. was inadequate in two ways. First, the Court, while
purporting to resolve the conflict, merely relied on its previous opinions. FMC Corp.
added nothing novel to the reasoning set forth in Metropolitan Life. Second, the Court
failed to justify, or even clarify further, the basis upon which it drew the line between
self-funded health plans and fully-insured health plans. The continued litigation in
the state courts and the split of opinion among the circuits post-Metropolitan Life and
pre-FMC Corp. should have informed the Court of the need for further explanation.
The Court has yet to address the gray area between these two polar extremes.
The gray area consists, in part, of self-funded plans which purchase stop-loss cover-
age from an insurance company. See supra note 8 for an explanation of stop-loss
coverage. This variety of self-funded plan remains problematic because the plan
combines elements of both poles. Because the majority of self-funded plans do
purchase stop-loss coverage from an insurance company, the potential for continued
litigation in the lower courts remains high. See supra note 17 for a percentage of self-
funded plans which purchase stop-loss coverage. The inability of the lower courts to
cull guidance from the Court's purported resolution of the issue is evidenced by the
continued split of opinions among the circuit courts. See supra note 8.
41. In 1962, President Kennedy "appointed a special cabinet-level task force to
study the reasons for lost employee benefits and to assess the resulting impact on the
economy." Peter H. Turza & Lorraine Halloway, Preemption of State Laws Under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 163, 166 (1979).
The task force's report (commonly referred to as the Wirtz Report) acknowl-
edged the inadequacies of existing federal regulations in the area of employee wel-
fare plans. Id. at 166 n.19. The first comprehensive reform legislation, however, was
not introduced in Congress until 1967. Id. at 166; see also supra note 20 for a discus-
sion of early congressional attempts to control abuse in employee welfare plans.
42. See infra notes 162-169 and accompanying text.
43. Preemption issues may arise whenever both the federal government and a
state government desire to regulate a specific activity or to promulgate laws which
seek to control the same sphere of activity. See generally William W. Bratton, Note, The
Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L.
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REV. 623, 624-39 (1975) (discussing the origins and contemporary development of
the preemption doctrine).
Over the years, the scope of preemption principles has been, and is still being,
refined by the courts. Two general schools of thought have emerged to determine
the scope and application of preemption principles.
A minority view holds that the ability of the federal government to preempt
state laws lies in the nature of concurrent state-federal power. This view
maintains that preemption occurs only when the subject matter of preemp-
tion cannot be adequately regulated by the states. The majority theory,
however, holds that the power of the federal government to preempt state
laws is based on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
This conventional theory focuses on legislative and statutory intent as the
ultimate standard for judicial analysis.
Brummond, supra note 22, at 93 (citations omitted).
Neither view, however, has emerged as a bright-line test for preemption. One
commentator noted cynically that the Court's "decisions in this area take on an ad
hoc, unprincipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doctrinal basis." Id at
95 (quoting Bratton, supra, at 624).
Yet, preemption issues seem to fall generally into two categories: "conflict and
interference cases" and "occupying the field cases." Brummond, supra note 22, at
94. In 1963, the United States Supreme Court created a two-prong test to determine
whether federal regulations concerning commerce preempt state law. Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963). In Florida Lime, the Court
stated that federal law prevails when either the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or when Congress has clearly shown an intent to pre-
empt state laws. Id. at 142.
Thus, under the initial prong of the Florida Lime test, courts first address whether
there is a conflict between state and federal law. "Most cases in this area fall some-
where on a spectrum between the situation where federal law directly mandates ac-
tion forbidden by the state, or vice versa, and the situation where the federal and
state laws operate in completely unrelated spheres." Brummond, supra note 22, at
94.
On the other hand, a court must apply a much broader standard to find that
Congress, in enacting federal legislation, has sought to "occupy the field." Under
this analysis, the existence of a conflict or interference between state and federal law
is irrelevant. Here the court will look only to the federal law to determine whether or
not preemption applies. The Court has enunciated several standards for courts to
consider when analyzing the "occupy the field" principle. Considerations include the
following:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or
the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject. Likewise, the object sought to be obtained
by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal
the same purpose. Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent
with the objective of the federal statute.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).
While congressional intent is oftentimes discernible from legislative history, ER-
ISA history contains scant legislative debate to guide the courts in determining con-
gressional intent. "One of the principal reasons for this lack of a clear manifestation
of intent is the fact that Congress, 'embroiled in controversy over policy issues, rarely
anticipates the possible ramifications of its acts upon state law.' " Brummond, supra
note 22, at 95 (citation omitted).
The reach of preemptive power has changed according to the makeup of the
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language to determine the scope of ERISA's preemption clause.44
A. Federal Preemption
Shortly after ERISA's enactment, its constitutionality was chal-
lenged.45 The courts concluded that the Tenth Amendment 6 posed
no bar to ERISA's operation because Congress correctly determined
that employee benefit plans affect interstate commerce and thus war-
Court. In the early 20th century, the Court generally upheld state legislation and
rarely inferred congressional intent for preemptive purposes. See generally Bratton,
supra at 626-30; Turza & Holloway, supra note 41, at 174-78; Harrop A. Freeman,
Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 630 (1972). This
trend was most notable when the public health and safety were concerned. Brum-
mond, supra note 22, at 96.
In 1941, however, the Court redirected its focus and established a federal pre-
sumption of preemption. During this more expansive period, a clear implication of
Congress' intent to preempt was adequate to accomplish preemption. Id.
By 1973, the Court again focused primarily on state interests when interpreting
preemption principles. "[U]nless state regulation was 'absolutely and totally contra-
dictory and repugnant' to the federal scheme, the Court injected an element of flexi-
bility into its analysis of federal-state relations." Id. (citing Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 553 (1973)).
Recent case history reflects the effect of this change in judicial attitudes toward
preemption:
If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intention
clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to super-
sede the exercise of the power of the state unless there is a clear manifesta-
tion of intention to do so. The exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly
to be presumed.
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952); see also FMC Corp., Ill S. Ct. at 407;
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 520, 525 (1977).
44. See generally Vranka, supra note 19, at 614-22 (describing methods used by
courts under fundamental preemption doctrine and statutory construction).
45. See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
In Hewlett-Packard, the district court barred a Tenth Amendment challenge to ERISA.
Relying on the United States Supreme Court, the opinion noted, "The Tenth
Amendment does not deprive 'the national government of authority to resort to all
means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted
to the permitted end.'"' Id. at 1301 (quoting Oklahoma v. Allanson Co., 313 U.S.
508, 534 (1941) (citations omitted)); see also Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F.
Supp. 695, 708-11 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge, due pro-
cess arguments, and contention that ERISA interferes with a state's taxing power).
46. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple." U.S. CONST. amend. X. Even though the Constitution does not grant specific
power to Congress to enact legislation such as ERISA, Congress may, by invoking the
necessary and proper clause, tie its objective into one of the constitutionally enumer-
ated powers. With ERISA, Congress circumvented any Tenth Amendment problems
by using the Commerce Clause as a necessary and proper means of satisfying its goal.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary
and Proper Clause); see also supra note 19.
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rant federal intervention.47 Furthermore, preemption of contempo-
raneous state legislation was necessary to accomplish the legislative
purposes of ERISA.48 Because the Supremacy Clause states that the
"Constitution, and the Laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme law of the Land,"49 the Constitution itself allows for pre-
emption of state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws
of Congress."50 However, the "exercise of federal supremacy is not
lightly to be presumed."5'
The language of ERISA's preemption clause itself confirms Con-
gress' purported intent to exclusively occupy the field.52 The courts
used long-established preemption principles to determine here that
Congress had "unmistakably ordained" to control this aspect of
commerce. While it was correct to conclude that Congress' intent to
control employee benefit plans was clear on its face, the scope of the
preemption and deemer clauses remained problematic for the courts
because Congress employed vague language in its construction of
the statute. Thus, the Court turned to principles of statutory inter-
pretation to elucidate congressional intent regarding the scope of
ERISA's clauses.
B. Statutory Interpretation
The United States Supreme Court has dealt extensively with statu-
tory interpretation questions in ERISA.53 In the past decade, the
Court has made several attempts to address the interpretative
problems regarding the interrelationship of the clauses in section
514 of ERISA.54 Noting that courts must " 'begin with the language
47. Hewlett-Packard, 425 F. Supp. at 1301.
48. See id.
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981) (citing Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824)).
51. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952). Unless "Congress has 'unmis-
takably ... ordained' that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce,"
the presumption lies against preemption of state power. Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
52. See supra note 29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the scope of the
preemption clause; see also supra note 43.
53. Most recently, the United States Supreme Court dealt with the statutory in-
terpretation of ERISA's preemption clause stating, " 'Preemption may be either ex-
press or implied, and is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in
the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.'" FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990) (quoting Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at
525).
54. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Alessi, 451 U.S. 504.
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employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary mean-
ing of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose,' -55
the Court carefully and consecutively addressed each significant
phrase within section 514's clauses. 56 Although the Court, specifi-
cally in its interpretation of the "deemer clause," has established a
trend toward allowing a distinction between fully-insured plans and
self-insured plans, the constant flux within the health care industry
creates the potential for continued state action challenging the
Court's holdings.
1. The Preemption Clause and the "Relates to" Language
ERISA's preemption clause states that ERISA "shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan." 5 7 To determine the scope of ERISA's pre-
emption clause, the United States Supreme Court first examined
which state laws were superseded by ERISA's preemption clause.58
In measuring the breadth of ERISA's preemptive effect, the Court
had to define which state laws "related to" employee benefit plans.
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 59 represented the Court's first look at de-
termining the scope of ERISA's preemption clause. In the early
eighties, several airlines and other employers sought injunctive relief
in federal court regarding the pregnancy provisions of the New York
Human Rights Law and the New York Disability Benefits Law. 60 The
combined effect of the laws forbade employment discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy and required employers to offer disability
benefits for pregnancy and other nonoccupational disabilities.61
The employers contended that, insofar as the New York Human
Rights Law related to employee benefit plans, ERISA operated to
preempt state law. 62 Arguing for the broadest interpretation of the
preemption clause, the employers claimed that the state could not
55. FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 407 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly,
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)). The Court also noted if the " 'intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court. . . must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress.' " Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43 (1984)). Unfortunately, Con-
gres§ gave little guidance as to its intent, hence the copious amount of case history
attempting to interpret each significant provision.
56. Id.
57. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
58. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97-99.
59. Id. at 95.
60. Id. at 88. The New York Human Rights Act forbids employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of pregnancy. The Disability Benefits Law requires employers to
pay sick leave benefits to pregnant employees unable to work. Id.
61. Id. at 88-90.
62. Id. at 92.
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directly regulate ERISA-covered benefit 'plans. 63 The New York
Commissioner of Human Rights, on the other hand, zeroed in on
section 514(d) of ERISA which provides, "§ 514(a) [the preemption
clause] shall not 'be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law of the United States.' "64 The Commis-
sioner argued that New York's Human Rights Law provided "a
means of enforcing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 which
made discrimination based on pregnancy unlawful under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."65
After embarking on a long analysis of the "relates to" language of
ERISA's preemption clause, the Court found that the New York
Human Rights Law and the Disability Benefits Law most definitely
related to employee benefit plans.66 Applying the "plain meaning"
test,6 7 the Court held, "A law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan,
in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or refer-
ence to such a plan."68 Because the New York Human Rights Law
related to employee benefit plans, the law could be preempted, but
"only insofar as it prohibit[ed] practices that [were] lawful under fed-
eral law."69
Thus, the Court interpreted the language employed by Congress
to denote the expansive breadth of the preemption clause. Most
courts have accepted this broad definition of "relates to" and gener-
ally have found that many state laws "relate" in some way to em-
ployee benefit plans.70
63. Id. at 100-101.
64. Id.
65. Id. Because Congress allowed for joint state/federal jurisdiction to enforce
the provisions of Title VII, construing ERISA to preempt the New York state law
entirely would invalidate and impair the state's right to enforce a provision of Title
VII. Id. at 102.
66. Id. at 96.
67. The Court adopted the Black's Law Dictionary definition to reach the plain
meaning of the language used by Congress: "'Relate. To stand in some relation; to
have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into association with or connec-
tion with.' " Id. at 97 n.16 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1288 (6th ed. 1990)).
68. Id. at 96-97.
69. Id. at 108.
70. Congress' purpose in constructing a broad preemption clause was to ensure
the uniform regulation of employee welfare plans. Thus, where a patchwork scheme
of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program opera-
tion, the courts have maximized the breadth of the preemption clause to effect con-
gressional intent. See Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
Given "the breadth of the preemption clause, courts will rarely find state laws to be
beyond its scope." See Jackson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 805 F.2d 1498, 1499 (11 th
Cir. 1986).
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2. The Savings Clause and Laws that "Regulate Insurance"
The incorporation of the savings clause 7 ' into ERISA returned all
regulatory and legislative power regarding insurance, banking, and
securities to the states. Two years after Shaw, the Court analyzed
which state laws "regulated insurance" within the meaning of the
savings clause.
a. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts 72
In 1979, the Massachusetts Attorney General sought an injunction
forcing Metropolitan Life Insurance Company to comply with a state
statute requiring all insurers to provide minimum coverage for
mental health benefits.73 After a trial, a permanent injunction was
issued.7 4 This judgment was affirmed on appeal.7 5
In Metropolitan Life, the Court first concluded that the Massachu-
setts statute7 6 requiring certain minimum mental health care benefits
related to employee welfare plans. 7 7 Thus the state law was pre-
empted-unless it regulated insurance within the scope of the sav-
ings clause. In its opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Massachusetts statute at issue regulated the business of insurance as
defined in the McCarran-Ferguson Act.7 8 Cases interpreting the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act have developed three criteria
to determine whether an employee benefit plan has engaged in the
business of insurance: "[Ffirst, whether the practice has the effect of
transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the
practice is an integral part of the policy relationship between the in-
surer and the insured; and third, whether the practice is limited to
entities within the insurance industry."79 Generally, a self-funded
71. See supra note 33.
72. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
73. Id. at 734. The statute required that any Massachusetts resident "insured
under a general health insurance policy, an accident or sickness insurance policy, or
an employee health-care plan that cover[ed] hospital and surgical expenses" receive
specified minimum mental health benefits. Id. at 727.
74. Id. at 735.
75. See Attorney General v. Travelers Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 1223 (Mass. 1982),
vacated sub nom., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 463 U.S. 1221 (1983).
76. See MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (West Supp. 1985).
77. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 739.
78. Id. at 743. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress explicitly stated,
"The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the
laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business."
McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1988).
79. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 743 (emphasis in original) (quoting Union Labor
Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982)). Comparing the three McCarran-
Ferguson criteria, one court held, "No one factor is dispositive; rather each is instruc-
tive." United Food & Commercial Workers v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir.
1986).
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employee benefit plan will fail to meet the third criterion and hence
will not have engaged in the business of insurance.80
Relying on basic preemption principles, the Court, in Metropolitan
Life, declined to narrow the scope of the savings clause:
[Als in any pre-emption analysis, "'[t]he purpose of Congress is
the ultimate touchstone.'" Where the pre-emptive effect of federal
enactments is not explicit, "courts sustain a local regulation 'unless
it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal scheme,
or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances
that Congress sought to occupy the field to the exclusion of the
States.' "81
Even though Congress sought to occupy the field, the Court con-
80. Volumes of material have been published which describe the nature of the
"business of insurance." On one level, the concept of insurance is easily defined: "In
its simplest form .... insurance is 'an arrangement for transferring and distributing
risk.'" Brummond, supra note 22, at 68 (citation omitted). On another level, these
simple insurance concepts may be used by entities which do not constitute an insur-
ance company per se (e.g., a self-funded employee benefit plan).
ERISA specifically requires that courts pinpoint laws which regulate insurance.
See ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). But ERISA does not
specify if its reference to insurance means the insurance industry per se or other
entities which utilize generally accepted insurance principles.
Two schools of thought have emerged to describe the scope of insurance. The
first emphasizes the process of transfer and views the purpose of insurance from the
perspective of the insured: "Insurance is a device for the reduction of the uncertainty
of one party, called the insured, through the transfer of particular risks to another
party, called the insurer, who offers a restoration, at least in part, of economic losses
suffered by the insured." Brummond, supra note 22, at 68 (quoting IRVING PFEFFER,
INSURANCE AND ECONOMIC THEORY 53 (1956)). The second school of thought delves
into the concept of "pooling of risk." Under the "pooling of risk" theory, any one
individual's risk is lessened by the aggregation of many insured individuals, all of
whom share the other's risks. Id. at 69.
A close examination of the nature of self-funded employee benefit plans demon-
strates that, in practice, an employer who self-funds its benefit plan obligation satis-
fies most of the elements of insurance as defined by the above schools of thought:
First, self-insurance is a "method for dealing with uncertainty concerning
loss." Second, the "pooling" school of thought describes precisely the
function of self-insurance: self-insurance attempts to eliminate uncertainty
by distributing risk among a large number of similarly exposed individuals.
Third, the risk of loss associated with illness, death and other insurable
events is transferred from employees (insureds) to the self-insured benefit
plan (insurer). Finally, self-insured plans establish a risk reserve from pre-
mium income (employer contributions) to satisfy benefit claims which arise
on account of contractional contingencies (plan benefit obligations).
Id. at 77.
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act embodies all of these fundamental con-
cepts, the Act's third criterion specifies that the "practice must be limited to entities
within the insurance industry." Unfortunately courts have latched on to the literal
wording of the statute without examining the fact that, in reality, self-funded plans
operate on the bases clearly established by the insurance industry.
81. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747-48 (citations omitted); see also supra note 43
for a discussion of the scope of preemption issues.
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cluded that Congress also intended, by virtue of the savings clause,
to allow states to regulate insurance. Because Massachusetts' man-
dated benefit law regulated insurance within the scope of the savings
clause, the Court held that it was saved from ERISA's preemptive
effect.82 However, the Court qualified its ruling: the state mandated
benefit law was saved from federal preemption only in the case of
"insurance contracts purchased for plans subject to ERISA."83
The Court acknowledged that its holding drew a distinction be-
tween self-insured and fully-insured plans.84 However, the Court ex-
plained that the distinction is one that "Congress is aware of and one
it has chosen not to alter."85 Moreover, the Court justified the dis-
tinction based on its interpretation of the "deemer clause."86 Had
the Court stopped before drawing this line between true insured
plans and self-funded plans, much of the subsequent litigation would
have been avoided.
In Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,87 Justice O'Connor refined the
Court's interpretation of which laws truly regulated insurance within
the meaning of the savings clause. Building on the Court's prior
holding in Metropolitan Life, Justice O'Connor found that Mississippi
state laws of bad faith and fraud-in the broadest sense--do relate to
employee benefit plans.88 However, even laws that relate to benefit
plans may avoid preemption, by way of the savings clause, if the
plaintiff can show that the law is one that regulates insurance.89
In Pilot Life, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals' judgment in favor of a plaintiff alleging
common law breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud
82. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 746.
83. Id. at 758.
84. Id. at 747.
85. Id. In 1977, a congressional activity report discussed the different treatment
between self-insured plans and fully-insured plans:
To the extent that [certain programs selling insurance policies] fail to meet
the definition of an "employee benefit plan" [subject to the "deemer
clause"], state regulation of them is not preempted by section 514, even
though such state action is barred with respect to the plans which purchase
these "products."
Id. at n.25 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1785, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1977)).
86. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 748; see also infra notes 96-99. The deemer clause
provides:
Neither an employee benefit plan.., nor any trust established under such a
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank,
trust company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of
insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies
or investment companies.
ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1988).
87. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
88. Id. at 47-48.
89, See ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988).
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against an insurance company for improper processing of claim for
benefits.90 Employing .a common sense test,9 ' Justice O'Connor
greatly narrowed the impact of the savings clause:
A common-sense view of the word "regulates" would lead to the
conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law must not just
have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be specifically
directed toward that industry. Even though the Mississippi Supreme
Court has identified its law of bad faith with the insurance industry,
the roots of this law are firmly planted in the general principles of
Mississippi tort and contract law.9 2
Additionally, the Court found that the Mississippi state law of bad
faith met only one of the McCarran-Ferguson criteria93 needed to
establish the law as one that regulates insurance.94 The Court noted
that Mississippi's "common law of bad faith may be said to concern
'the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured.' The
connection to the insurer-insured relationship is attenuated at best,
however."95
3. The Deemer Clause and "Laws Purporting to Regulate Insurance"
Applying the insured-uninsured distinction drawn in Metropolitan
Life, the Court, in FMC Corp. v. Holliday,96 held that ERISA pre-
empted a Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law where the employee
welfare plan seeking subrogation was self-funded.9 7 Succinctly put,
"Our interpretation of the deemer clause makes clear that if a plan is
insured, a State may regulate it indirectly through regulation of its
insurer and its insurer's insurance contracts; if the plan is uninsured
[self-funded], the State may not regulate it."98
90. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 43-44.
91. Courts often use the "common sense" or plain meaning approach to inter-
pret statutory language. One federal judge, however, warned courts to heed too lit-
eral of a reading:
Courts cannot amend statutes in the guise of interpreting them, and they
must presume that Congress meant what it said. But the presumption,
though heavy, is rebuttable. It is not yet the prevailing federal rule that
"there is no surer way to misread any document than to read it literally."
Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (L. Hand, J., concurring), aff'd
sub nom. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945).
92. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
93. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson criteria.
94. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 51.
95. Id. at 50-51.
96. 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 411. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in FMC Corp.,
circuit courts were split as to whether self-funded plans could be governed by state
regulatory schemes. Compare Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d
416, 425 (7th Cir. 1988) ("State laws arguably 'regulating insurance' are preempted
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While not unique in its opinion, FMC Corp. is important because it
purported to resolve the conflict among the circuits between the
treatment of self-funded and fully-insured plans.99 On review, the
United States Supreme Court in FMC Corp. upheld the distinction it
had drawn in Metropolitan Life and stated that the deemer clause
barred states from regulating any aspect of any employee benefit
plan that was self-funded.0o The Court's opinion thus quashed any
end-run maneuvers that some dissenting lower courts had tried.
Additionally, the Court noted that its interpretation of the deemer
clause was "respectful of the presumption that Congress does not
intend to pre-empt areas of traditional state regulation."1Ol Citing
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 10 2 the Court found, "Congress pro-
vided that the 'business of insurance, and every person engaged
therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business.' "103
Future plaintiffs who seek to challenge the Court's distinction do,
however, have one friend left on the bench. In dissent, Justice Ste-
vens noted that the FMC Corp. majority drew a "broad and illogical
distinction between benefit plans that are funded by the employer
and those that are insured by regulated insurance companies."104 In
fact, Justice Stevens urged the majority to remember that plan bene-
ficiaries were the ones whom Congress sought to protect.
by ERISA as to self-insured plans"), cemt. denied, 488 U.S. 856 (1988), with Northern
Group Servs., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85, 90-95 (6th Cir.
1987) (holding that a state law which "regulates insurance" is saved from preemption
as to a self-insured (uninsured) plan when "there is no demonstrated interest in na-
tional uniformity and preemption of state law would substantially disrupt a state reg-
ulatory scheme generally applicable to both insured and self-insured ERISA plans, as
well as to insurers generally."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988), and Rasmussen v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 675 F. Supp. 1497, 1503 (W.D. La. 1987) ("the necessity
of the insured/uninsured distinction has been cast in serious doubt by the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Pilot Lif.") (citation omitted).
Pilot Life encouraged courts to take a common-sense approach to determining
whether a particular law regulates the business of insurance. Additionally, the court
adopted the test from the McCarran-Ferguson Act to distinguish laws that purport to
regulate the business of insurance. See Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 49-52; see also supra notes
79-80 and accompanying text.
99. FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 407. Eleven days before the Third Circuit's ruling in
FMC Corp., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had addressed an almost identical set
of facts and had reached the opposite conclusion. Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182 (8th
Cir. 1989).
100. FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at411.
101. Id. at 410 (citingJones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (pre-
serving "historic police powers" to the states absent a "clear and manifest" directive
from Congress).
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988).
103. FMC Corp., 111 S. Ct. at 410 (quoting McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1012(a) (1988)).
104. Id. at 411.
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[Tjhere is no apparent reason for treating self-insured plans differ-
ently from insured plans.... The notion that this disparate treat-
ment of similarly situated beneficiaries is somehow supported by
an interest in uniformity is singularly unpersuasive. If Congress
had intended such an irrational result, surely it would have ex-
pressed it in straightforward English.' 0 5
Essentially then, through judicial interpretation, the United States
Supreme Court has determined congressional intent and the inter-
play of the clauses as follows:
The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth. It estab-
lishes as an area of exclusive federal concern the subject of every
state law that "relate[s] to" an employee benefit plan governed by
ERISA. The saving clause returns to the States the power to en-
force those state laws that "regulat[e] insurance," except as pro-
vided in the deemer clause. Under the deemer clause, an employee
benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be "deemed" an insur-
ance company, an insurer, or engaged in the business of insurance
for purposes of state laws "purporting to regulate" insurance com-
panies or insurance contracts. 1
06
IV. EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S HANDLING OF SELF-FUNDED ERISA
QUESTIONS
A. Baxter v. LynnO7
Christopher Baxter, a minor, was injured while riding as a passen-
ger in his grandmother's car. His father's self-funded employee
health plan (the Fund) paid for Christopher's medical expenses in-
curred in the accident.108 The driver of the second vehicle, Charlene
Lynn, had no automobile insurance. However, Christopher's grand-
mother carried an automobile insurance policy with Allstate, which
provided for $25,000 of uninsured motorist coverage, along with
medical payment coverage of $5,000.109
The Baxters sued both Lynn and Allstate in state court. Allstate,
not denying its liability to pay $30,000, interpled the Fund and had
no further involvement in the case."10 The issue in Baxter was the
validity of a subrogation provision within the self-funded employee
health care plan against the third party recovery rights accorded by
the Allstate plan. " '
105. Id. at 411-12.
106. Id. at 407.
107. 886 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1989).
108. Id. at 184. The Fund paid medical expenses amounting to $23,305.00. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. Allstate interpled the Fund because the policy included a clause subrogat-
ing the Baxter's right of recovery from third persons. Id.
111. Id. at 188. The applicable provision arguably created a subrogation lien for
benefits paid to the Baxters by Allstate. Id. at 186-87.
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First, the Baxters asserted that common law principles disallowed
subrogation claims against uninsured motorist benefits and con-
tended that the Fund had "a contractual obligation, independent of
Allstate's obligation, to pay for the medical expenses arising from
the automobile accident."112 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected the plaintiff's argument based on its interpretation of the
preemption analysis previously set forth by the Supreme Court. l3
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that, in a gen-
eral sense, the state law of subrogation does relate to the insurance
industry and holders of insurance contracts, but a state's subrogation
law does "not regulate the insurance industry directly. Application
of differing state subrogation laws to plan providers throughout the
United States would frustrate ERISA's uniform treatment of benefit
plans."14 Thus, the state anti-subrogation law was not the type of
insurance law that could be saved from preemption, and the Fund
was entitled to subrogation.115
Second, the Baxters argued that the plan's subrogation provision
applied only to recoveries from the person who was responsible for
the injury, Charlene Lynn.1 6 Because the recovery proceeds flowed
from Christopher's grandmother's insurance policy, the subrogation
clause was inapplicable. The applicable subrogation clause read:
In the event the Fund pays benefits on behalf of any Covered Indi-
vidual, for illness or injury for which the Covered Individual has
the right to recover, the Fund shall be subrogated to the Covered
Individual's rights of recovery, to the extent of benefits paid, against
any person or entity who may be responsible. 117
The Fund interpreted this clause as allowing subrogation against
"any recovery made by or on behalf of Christopher Baxter, regard-
less of the source of that recovery."118 The parties' disagreement
over construction of ambiguous terms within an insurance contract
evolved into a standard of review question.l19 The court decided
that the district court had adopted the wrong standard of review and
remanded with instructions for de novo review consistent with its ear-
lier opinions. i20
112. Id. at 185.
113. Id.; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 48 (1987); Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 740 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
463 U.S. 85, 92 (1983); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504, 521 (1981).
114. Baxter, 886 F.2d at 186.
115. Id. at 187.
116. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. Id. (emphasis in the original on "any"; emphasis added on "source").
119. Id.
120. Id. at 188; see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
Baxter adopted the standard of review determined in Bruch:
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B. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Linthicum'21
In 1987, the Linthicum family was injured in an automobile acci-
dent.122 Christy Linthicum, a daughter of the insured, incurred se-
vere injuries and required extensive medical treatment, amounting
to over $100,000.123 In 1988, the Linthicums commenced an action
in state court against the other driver and recovered $225,000
through settlement.124 In response, Provident, administrator of the
self-funded health plan, filed a medical lien against the Linthicums,
claiming subrogation rights against their third-party recovery on the
basis of its employee health plan contract.' 2 5
In November 1989, Provident filed an action against the
Linthicums for declaratory and injunctive relief.126 Defending on
the basis of equity, the Linthicums contended that, under Arkansas
state law, "subrogation was unconscionable and in violation of the
public policy of the state and that . . . an insurer had no right of
subrogation where the compensation recovered by the insured from
the tortfeasor is less than the insured's actual loss."127 The
Linthicums claimed that the state anti-subrogation statute tradition-
ally fell within the ambit of state insurance regulation and thus was
"saved" from ERISA preemption, notwithstanding the deemer
clause provision or the employee welfare plan's self-funded
nature. 128
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not dispute that Christy
Linthicum had received far less compensation from the tortfeasor
than was necessary to "make her whole."1 2 9 Nonetheless, relying on
Baxter,1 30 the court rejected respondent's argument and held, that,
If the Fund's plan gives its trustees the discretion to interpret the meaning
of the subrogation clause .... this interpretation is subject to the arbitrary
and capricious standard of review. If no such authority is provided for in the
plan, however, the dispute must be resolved by a de novo review of the plan's
terms and other manifestations of the parties' intent.
Baxter, 886 F.2d at 187 (citing Bruch, 489 U.S. at 955). In Baxter, the Fund's plan
granted no such authority to its trustees, thus the district court should have con-
ducted a de novo review. Id.
121. 930 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1991).
122. Id. at 15.
123. Id. Thomas and Patricia Linthicum's injuries were less severe. Their medical
expenses totaled $3,676.55. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Provident also filed a motion to intervene which was denied. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 16.
129. Id. at 15-16.
130. See id. at 16. The Baxter court addressed a nearly identical set of facts and
relied on analysis set forth in United States Supreme Court decisions. See Baxter v.
Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 184-86 (8th Cir. 1989).
The Third Circuit reached a contrary result, ruling that a Pennsylvania anti-sub-
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because the employee health plan was self-funded, ERISA operated to
preempt any state anti-subrogation law or state policy.131 The court
affirmed the district court's ruling and ordered the Linthicums to re-
imburse Provident in the amount of $105,737.17.132
C Impact on Baxter and Linthicum of Self-Funded Nature of ERISA
Plan
The only distinguishable characteristic between the health care
plans offered by the employers in Baxter and Linthicum and a health
care plan purchased by an employer via an insurance company is the
source of funding to pay medical claims. In both Baxter and Linthi-
cum, the employer self-funded its benefit plan. Had these plans been
"insured plans," the Fund could not have subrogated the Baxter's
recovery on their injured son, nor would Christy Linthicum have re-
ceived far less compensation than she was entitled to under equitable
principles. The result in both of these cases begs the question
rogation statute withstood the preemptive force of ERISA's deemer clause as applied
to self-funded employee benefit plans. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79, 90
(3d Cir. 1989), vacated, Ill S. Ct. 403 (1990); see also supra notes 96-99 and 106 and
accompanying text.
In FMC Corp., the Third Circuit held that the proper inquiry under the deemer
clause is "whether the state insurance regulation intentionally or unintentionally ad-
dresses a core type of ERISA matter which Congress sought to protect by the pre-
emption provisions. The court, reviewing a state insurance law, should inquire
whether that law conflicts with any substitute mandate in ERISA." Id. at 89-90; see
also Northern Group Servs., Inc. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987)
(holding that courts must look to the nature of the state law itself and balance the
federal interest in uniformity against the displacement of traditional state regulation),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the con-
flict between the circuits. Reversing the Third Circuit in FMC Corp., Justice
O'Connor interpreted the deemer clause to exclude self-funded employee benefit
plans from "state laws that 'regulat[e] insurance' within the meaning of the savings
clause." FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 409 (1990). Simply put, Justice
O'Connor stated:
[S]elf-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as that
regulation "relate[s] to" the plans. State laws directed toward the plans are
pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit plan but are not
"saved" because they do not regulate insurance. State laws that directly
regulate insurance are "saved" but do not reach self-funded employee bene-
fit plans because the plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies,
other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of such
state laws.
Id.
131. See Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Linthicum, 930 F.2d 14, 16 (8th Cir.
1991) (citing with approval as controlling authority Baxter, 886 F.2d at 182). But see
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 885 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that self-funded em-
ployee benefit plan did not preempt Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law), vacated, 111
S. Ct. 403 (1990).
132. See Linthicum, 930 F.2d at 16.
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whether individual plan participants should suffer for the sake of
"uniformity in the regulation of employee benefit plans" where, in
reality, the uniformity is nonexistent.
V. MINNESOTA COURTS' HANDLING OF SELF-FUNDED ERISA
QUESTIONS
The Minnesota Supreme Court has followed the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court in its deci-
sions regarding self-funded insurance plans. Although the State of
Minnesota has been a national leader in innovative insurance regula-
tion,133 the Minnesota Department of Commerce has still been un-
able to crack the stronghold of ERISA's preemption clause regarding
self-funded employee benefit plans.' 3 4
A. Hunt v. Sherman' 3 5
In 1981, Jeffrey Hunt severely injured his hand in a power lawn-
mower operated by the defendant.136 The plaintiff's father brought
suit for "negligence by an adolescent lawnmower operator and negli-
gent entrustment by the minor's parents."'17 The parties settled the
133. Compare MINN. STAT. § 62E. 16 (1990) (Minnesota's COBRA statute, originally
codified in 1976) with 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (1988) (federal COBRA statute, originally
codified in 1986). See also Health Right Act, ch. 549, art. 3, § 19, 1992 Minn. Sess.
Law Serv. 1060. The Health Right Act represents Minnesota's latest attempt at inno-
vative health insurance law. Signed by Governor Arne Carlson in May 1992, the
Health Right Act seeks to establish state-wide health insurance programs for low-
income, uninsured people. Most significantly though, the Act-in blatant terms-
requests an exemption from ERISA's deemer clause restrictions: "The commis-
sioner of commerce shall request and diligently pursue an exemption from the fed-
eral preemtpion of state laws relating to health coverage provided under employee
welfare benefit plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
.... Id.
In addition, the Act specifically requests permission "to regulate self-insured
health plans to the same extent as insurance companies." Id. § 19, subd. 2. Finally,
subd. 3 highlights the expansiveness of legislative efforts to circumvent the prior
holdings of the Court by seeking an exemption that would "permit the state to enact
or adopt other state laws relating to health coverage that would, in the judgment of
the commissioner of commerce, further the public policies of this state." Id. § 19,
subd. 3. In light of the trend established by the United States Supreme Court, the
success of the state's request is doubtful.
134. See Minnesota Chamber of Commerce v. Hatch, 672 F. Supp. 393 (D. Minn.
1987) (barring insurance commissioner from requiring self-funded benefit plans to
file security or surety bond with the Minnesota Department of Commerce); St. Paul
Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980) (perma-
nently enjoining the Minnesota Commerce Department from requiring self-insurers
to contribute to the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Association).
135. 345 N.W.2d 750 (Minn. 1984).
136. Id. at 751.
137. Id.
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suit for $100,000, and both parties agreed that the award did not
fully compensate the plaintiff for his injury.' 3 8 Plaintiff received
medical compensation through his father's self-insured employee
benefit plan, which intervened and sought reimbursement for the
medical expenses paid pursuant to the subrogation provision in the
plan contract. '
3 9
On appeal, the plaintiffs attempted to garner support from a foot-
note in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc. 140 In Shaw, Justice Blackmun noted, "Some state ac-
tions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or
peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the
plan."'41 Thus, on the basis of Shaw, the plaintiffs argued that be-
cause Minnesota's state subrogation law did not relate to the plan,
the state law was not preempted by ERISA.142
In addition to using Shaw, the plaintiffs urged the court to consider
the Minnesota rule of law established in Westendorfv. Stasson.143 The
Westendorf rule states that an insurer "is not entitled to reimburse-
ment in the absence of full recovery."' 4 4 Alternatively, plaintiffs as-
serted that, even if the state subrogation law did relate to the plan,
the law was nonetheless saved from preemption by ERISA's savings
clause.'45 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected both arguments
and affirmed the district court's grant of subrogation rights to the
plan.146
Interpreting the relationship between ERISA's savings clause and
the deemer clause, the court stated,
Although it is true that [the savings clause] does not pre-empt state
law dealing with insurance companies or with insurance contracts,
the state subrogation law at issue in the instant case involves
no insurance.... Because the ERISA Plan in this case does not
involve insurance, the insurance exception is wholly
inapplicable." 147
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Yetka focused more accurately on
the characterization of the plan at issue.14 8 Justice Yetka deemed the
plan an insurance contract and argued, therefore, that the savings
clause preserved the plaintiff's state law cause of action. Justice
138. Id.
139. Id. Jeffrey Hunt incurred medical expenses amounting to $8,371.17. Id.
140. See Hunt, 345 N.W.2d at 753.
141. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983).
142. Hunt, 345 N.W.2d at 753.
143. 330 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1983).
144. Id. at 701.
145. See Hunt, 345 N.W.2d at 753.
146. Id. at 753-54.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 754 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
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Yetka reasoned that the correct result is that the plan should not be
reimbursed until the injured party is compensated in full.149
B. St. Paul Electrical Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman' 50
In St. Paul Electrical Workers, a group of self-funded employee bene-
fit plans challenged a Minnesota insurance statute devised to create
the Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act of 1976
(MCHIA). 1'5 The operation of MCHIA is threefold:
First, it requires that every health and accident insurer shall offer to
Minnesota residents qualified policies or unqualified policies con-
taining a specified amount of major medical coverage. Qualified
policies are those which provide certain statutorily mandated bene-
fits or the actuarial equivalent of those benefits. Second, employ-
ers who offer health care plans to their employees must make
available to them a certain type of qualified plan. Finally, the Act
creates the Comprehensive Health Association and charges it with
operating a comprehensive health insurance plan designed to offer
policies to individuals who are unable to obtain health and accident
insurance through normal channels. The Association is also avail-
able to reinsure qualified policies issued by individual carriers.' 52
Additionally, the statute required all " 'insurers, self insurers,
fraternals and health maintenance organizations' to join the associa-
tion .... Failure to maintain membership in the association [could]
result in termination of the member's right to do business in the
state."153
The self-insurers, arguing on the basis of federal preemption
under ERISA, claimed that the MCHIA unjustly subjected them to
"substantive and reporting requirement provisions of the state insur-
ance laws."'54 The Minnesota District Court agreed and perma-
nently enjoined the insurance commissioner from enforcing the
obligations submitted under the MCHIA against self-insurers. The
court found that the deemer clause of ERISA precluded a state from
directly regulating an employee benefit plan as a traditional insurer
and, where "'Congress' command [was] explicitly stated in the stat-
149. Id.
150. 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980).
151. Id. at 932.
152. Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921, 923 (D. Minn.
1976).
153. St. Paul Electrical Workers, 490 F. Supp. at 932-33.
154. Id. at 933. The reporting requirements for self-insurers include, among
other things, the cost of self-insurance. Other state law requirements include a con-
tinuation provision allowing employees to continue insurance for six months follow-
ing termination, a conversion provision allowing a transfer from group to individual
coverage, and specific minimum coverage requirements. Id.
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ute's language,' pre-emption must be found."155
However, four years prior to St. Paul Electrical Workers, a group of
insurers unsuccessfully challenged the state's ability to regulate the
substantive requirements of employee benefit plans through
MCHIA. In Insurers'Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton,156 the plaintiffs ar-
gued that MCHIA's requirement to offer specified types of benefits
to employees through their employee benefit plans was preempted
by ERISA.157
Rejecting this argument, the Minnesota District Court broadly
construed the savings clause of ERISA, finding, "the conflict be-
tween the challenged state insurance law and ERISA has to be very
clear in order to trigger the preemption provision." 158 Additionally,
the court distinguished between the substantive requirements of ER-
ISA which relate only to reporting requirements and fiduciary duties
and have nothing to do with the substantive requirements of
MCHIA.159
Finally, the court examined the relationship between ERISA and
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, noting that ERISA itself "shall not be
construed to supersede any law of the United States. The McCarran-
Ferguson Act mandates that the business of insurance shall be regu-
lated by the states. In light of these statutory considerations, the ul-
timate success of plaintiffs' preemption claim is questionable at
best."160
VI. ANALYSIS
A. Did Congress Really Intend to Distinguish Between Self-Funded and
Fully-Insured Employee Benefit Plans?
Several arguments exist to reason that Congress did not intend to
distinguish between self-funded plans and fully-insured plans. First,
a close investigation of ERISA's legislative history demonstrates that
Congress' primary goal for promulgation of ERISA legislation fo-
cused directly on controlling abuses in the private pension plan
area.'61 While ERISA's legislative history provides ample evidence
155. Id. at 934 (citing dictum in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1979)); see also supra note 43.
156. 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976).
157. Id. at 926. Plaintiffs focused on the definitions in ERISA and specifically ar-
gued that, since health and accident insurance is defined as an "employee welfare
benefit plan," it is also an "employee benefit plan" and MCHIA was preempted. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. The reporting and disclosure provisions are the only substantive parts of
ERISA which relate to health and accident insurance.
160. Id. (citations omitted).
161. See Brummond, supra note 22, at 115. "Volumes of testimony before the
House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor and
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of the exhaustive congressional thought process involved in protect-
ing employees in the pension plan area, Congress devoted "[o]nly a
very small segment of this testimony [on pension-related abuses] to
the problems relating to employee welfare benefit programs. As a
result, many of the regulatory provisions found in Title I of ERISA
apply only to employee pension benefit plans."162
Second, the lack of congressional debate over the interrelationship
of the preemption clause, the savings clause, and the deemer clause
demonstrates that Congress itself may not have been aware of the
ultimate impact of its legislation. In fact, "every preemptive section
in pension-related bills was worded so that federal law would super-
sede state law only in those specific areas regulated by the federal
bill."163 The now problematic preemptive effect of section 514's
"deeming language" was not added until February 28, 1974, when
the House passed its version of the bill.164
During Conference Committee discussions, the "entire thrust of
the preemption language was reversed; instead of preempting state
laws only insofar as they regulated the same areas explicitly regu-
lated by ERISA, section 514(a) was changed to preempt all state laws
unless otherwise excluded."165 Congress became aware of these
changes only ten days before the final vote, when the Committee
filed its report.' 66
In 1974, when the conferee's report came up for approval, the
state of the country was such that, during the month of August, Con-
gress had focused upon other matters of national concern.' 67 "It
would be naive to suppose that. . . any serious attention could have
been devoted to such matters as the status of an obscure preemption
provision in a 250-page federal statute."' 68
At the point of promulgation, congressional committees had
Public Welfare focus on pension-related abuses and how such abuses can be cor-
rected." Id.
162. Id. at 115.
163. Id.;see also id. at 115 n.466.
164. Id. at 116.
165. Id.
166. "Congress could not possibly have understood the nature of the critical con-
feree changes." Id. at 115. Congress devoted almost no attention to the language of
section 514. Id.
167. During the month of August 1974, when the conference committee's report
was before Congress, Richard Nixon stepped down from the office of the Presidency.
168.
In view of the fact that the present language of section 514 was inserted by
the Conference Committee at a very late hour, after no congressional hear-
ings, and with little explanatory comment, serious doubts can be raised re-
garding congressional intent to broadly preempt state laws regulating
employee welfare benefit plans.
Id. at 116.
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worked on reform legislation in the area of pension plans and em-
ployee benefit plans for nearly twelve years. Thus, the lack of legisla-
tive debate in the area of employee benefit plans, combined with the
significant historical events of 1974, lends credence to the theory
that congressional members were not fully aware of the significant
impact ERISA legislation would cast on employee benefit plans and
perhaps may not have intended to distinguish self-funded plans from
fully-insured plans.
B. Differences in the Nature of Self-Funded Plans Versus Fully-Insured
Plans
1. Distinguishing Between the True Characteristics of Self-Funded and
Fully-Insured Benefit Plans
While an employer has the choice to fund its own benefit plan or
to purchase a plan from an insurance company, the only distinguish-
able difference, required state regulations aside, in the nature of the
benefit plan is the source of the funding. Even when an employer
chooses to fund its own benefit plan, the plan provides a benefit
schedule, assumes liability through a contractual document for pay-
ment of claims accorded by the benefit schedule, and designates the
amount of employee contribution based on insurance principles of
risk distribution.
The difference between the plans becomes even less discernible
where an employer self-funds its own plan but purchases excess
stop-loss coverage from an insurance company to limit its liability for
catastrophic losses.169 Likewise, if a self-funded employee benefit
plan hires a third party administrator to process its employees'
claims through an administrative services-only contract, the plan es-
169. While the United States Supreme Court has never considered what effect the
purchase of stop-loss insurance has on self-funded employee benefit plans, circuit
courts continue to grapple with the issue. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently held that a stop-loss policy which limited a self-funded benefit plan's liability to
$30,000 per employee did not convert the plan's self-funded nature into an insured
plan. See Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1990). In Granatelli, the
court looked beyond form to the "substance of the relationship between the plan, the
participants, and the insurance carrier." Id. The majority opined that a $30,000 level
of employer liability was sufficient to show that the employer's plan was not merely
acting as a "conduit for claims from participants to the [stop-loss carrier]." Id.; see
also Thompson v. Talquin Bldg. Prods. Co., 928 F.2d 649, 653 (4th Cir. 1991) (hold-
ing that purchase of $25,000 per participant stop-loss coverage does not convert self-
funded plan into an insured plan); Bricklayers Local No. 1 Welfare Fund v. Louisiana
Health Ins. Ass'n, 771 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La. 1991) (holding that purchase of stop-
loss coverage at $40,000 individual level did not destroy self-funded status of plan).
But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. American Community Mut. Ins. Co., 659 F.
Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (determining that a plan purchasing only $5,000 per
employee stop-loss policy is essentially an insured plan for purposes of ERISA
preemption).
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sentially uses the insurance expertise of a true insurance company
yet retains its self-funded status as well as the associated advantages.
Dissenting court opinions depict the practical reality of these dif-
ferences: Supreme CourtJustice Stevens noted the "broad and illog-
ical distinction" drawn by the majority in FMC Corp. and claimed,
"there is no apparent reason for treating self-insured plans differ-
ently from insured plans."' 70 Minnesota Supreme Court Justice
Yetka also dissented in Hunt on the ground that the self-funded em-
ployee benefit plan at issue was "really an insurance contract, bring-
ing it within the exception provided by" the savings clause.' 7 '
2. Distinguishing Between Federal Control of Pension Plans and
Employee Benefit Plans
ERISA drafters sought to protect the "voluntary nature" of em-
ployee benefit plans by facilitating administration and ensuring uni-
formity. Yet, from an employer's perspective, pension plans are
equally voluntary. However, a close look at the structure of ERISA
demonstrates that the drafters built in many more safeguards to pro-
tect pension plan participants than employee benefit plan partici-
pants. Case history illustrates the inequities which arise from this
lack of safeguards for self-funded benefit plan participants. Thus,
the drafters, while attempting to promote voluntary employee bene-
fit plans, ignored their main objective-protection of plan
participants.
At least one commentator has argued that ERISA's federal regula-
tory scheme is inappropriate to govern the area of employee benefit
plans.172 While Congress may have adequately incorporated safe-
guards to control abuses in the pension plan area through ERISA
legislation, employee benefit plans, by their distinguishable nature,
are ill-suited to that same protective scheme.'
73
Employee benefit plans differ from pension plans in several ways.
First, employee benefit plans "require a specific regulatory approach
170. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 411 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also supra note 37.
171. Hunt v. Sherman, 345 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. 1984) (Yetka, J., dissenting).
172. See Brummond, supra note 22, at 117. Even a cursory glance at the structure
of Title I demonstrates that less than half of its regulatory provisions apply to em-
ployee benefit plans. For example, Brummond notes that Part One applies only to
employee benefit plans with greater than 100 participants; Parts Two and Three ap-
ply only to pension plans. Id. While Parts Four and Five provide fiduciary standards
and an enforcement provision, Brummond argues that these provisions are ill-suited
to control employee benefit plans. Id.
173. Unfortunately Congress lumped together both pension plans and employee
welfare plans under one federal act without taking into consideration their dissimilar
natures.
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tailored to their individual purposes and needs."]74 ERISA regula-
tory provisions do not address these individual needs. For example,
ERISA's fiduciary standards relating to self-funded benefit plans do
not "take into account both the short-term nature of benefit claims
and the danger of unregulated self-insurance." 75 Furthermore,
Parts Four and Five of Title I do not provide
guarantees that a welfare benefit plan will meet its obligations
when they become due. Apparently the drafters of ERISA were not
as concerned with the funding of welfare benefit plans as they were
with the funding of pension benefit plans; they provided funding
guidelines for the latter but not the former.176
Thus, ERISA's regulatory scheme does not offer adequate safe-
guards to employee benefit plan participants.
C. Disparity and Disuniformities Created by Distinguishing Between Self-
Funded and Fully-Insured Benefit Plans
1. Employee Expectations
From an employee's perspective, as long as funding for the em-
ployee benefit plan exists, the actual source of funding is irrelevant.
Generally speaking, most employees are probably not even aware
that ERISA allows a distinction between benefit plans that are self-
funded by their employers and benefit plans that are purchased by
their employers. Most employees only care that they receive
benefits.
Employees have developed expectations which evolve directly
from traditional insurance concepts established by the insurance in-
dustry, common law principles of equity, and indirectly from insur-
ance schemes created by state regulatory agencies. Plaintiffs like the
Hollidays, the Linthicums, and the Hunts have found these expecta-
tions dashed by the courts' holdings that, in very simple terms, the
sole reason they lost was because their employee benefit plans were
self-funded.
2. Employer-Employee Relationship
Allowing an employer ultimate decision making power over claims
174. Id. at 117.
175. Id. Brummond also notes,
There are at least two dangers [to allowing federal control of self-funded
benefit plans] which concern state insurance regulators. The first is the pos-
sibility that inadequate amounts of money will be set aside to pay benefit
claims. The second is the danger that plan managers will use benefit monies
as operating capital.
Id. at 117 n.474 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 117 (noting, "there appears to be no justification for this omission").
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payment may jeopardize the employer-employee relationship.177
Even though federal law allows employers to tailor their self-funded
benefit plans to meet their own needs, employers may find them-
selves in a difficult position to explain to a needy employee why its
own self-funded benefit plan does not provide the same protections
which are guaranteed through the state regulatory agency.'T8
D. Impact of the Courts' Holdings on Self-Funded Plans
While the ultimate congressional intent behind ERISA legislation
may be magnanimous, the lack of congressional guidance defining
the scope of this intent has left courts in a quandary. Congress has
clearly stated its objective: ERISA legislation is focused on control-
ling employer abuses in employee welfare programs. More specifi-
cally, ERISA is designed to protect plan participants.179 Yet, the
impact of the legislation focuses more on the facilitation of uniform
administration of regulatory standards regarding employee benefit
plans from the perspective of employers. In Fort Halifax Packing Co.
v. Coyne,'80 the United States Supreme Court emphasized this posi-
tion, stating that to require plan providers to design their programs
in an environment of differing State regulations would complicate
the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that
employers might offset with decreased benefits.181 Thus, a "patch-
work scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficien-
cies in benefit program operation .... Preemption ensures that the
administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by only a
single set of regulations."1 82 However, the Court'here assumed that
uniform administrative requirements for employers will, in turn, pro-
vide uniform safeguards for plan participants.
While logically this assumption has merit, in practice, the assump-
tion holds true only if the notion is applied uniformly to both self-
177. See Butters, supra note 14, at 352. "If employees are misled or defrauded, the
attendant employer-employee relations problems would outweigh any temporary fi-
nancial advantage to the employer." Id. (citation omitted).
178. Even though no mandate exists requiring an employer to provide an em-
ployee benefit plan, basic economic principles ensure that employers will continue to
offer benefit packages, notwithstanding stricter regulations. In order to compete in
industry, employers must offer incentives to retain their employees. Many employees
measure the value of their jobs based on compensation received in addition to salary.
To argue that employers will cease offering benefit plans in the face of stricter com-
pliance rules ignores these fundamental economic realities.
179. See generally supra note 19. "[T]he policy of [ERISA is] to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans." ERISA
§ 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
180. 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
181. Id. at 10.
182. Id. at 11. The Court expanded on the advantages of a single regulatory
scheme for employers who provide benefit plans in multiple states. Id.
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funded plans and fully-insured plans. By drawing a distinction be-
tween these plans, the Court has established a trend allowing dis-
uniformity in protective safeguards for plan participants in employee
benefit programs. Obsequiously, lower courts have followed.
VII. ALTERNATIVES
To some, the passage of ERISA created a "moratorium of indefi-
nite length on the passage of [state] health insurance laws."183 One
judge was troubled by the possibility that "workers whom ERISA was
primarily intended to protect may be better off with state health in-
surance laws than without them, and the efforts of states ... to en-
sure that their citizens have low-cost comprehensive health insurance
may be significantly impaired by ERISA's preemption of health in-
surance laws." 184
The solution to the problems presented can be looked at as an all
or nothing situation: Congress could obliterate the savings clause
and adopt a comprehensive federal policy to regulate health insur-
ance, or Congress could obliterate the deemer clause and thus re-
turn to the states entirely the power to regulate employee benefit
plans.185 While the latter approach is favorable, other compromises
may exist to achieve a more equitable effect without the elimination
of large portions of ERISA.
First, Congress should amend ERISA to provide substantive, man-
dated benefit protection for all employee benefit plans. Provisions
would be determined on the basis of the needs of the general wel-
fare. To address these societal needs, most states have adopted min-
imum mandated benefit standards for mental health treatment, drug
treatment, and pregnancy.
Second, Congress should provide that self-funded benefit plans
which purchase excess stop-loss coverage would lose their self-
funded status. This provision would discourage employers from
self-funding solely to gain the associated economic advantages when,
in fact, the employer has passed off part of its liability to an insurance
company.
Third, Congress could allow states the power to regulate more
closely companies that act as third party administrators (TPAs). In
reality, many of the services provided by TPAs stem directly from
183. Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
184. Id. Judge Renfrew advised federal legislators to heed the admonition ofJus-
tice Brandeis to the federal courts that to "stay experimentation in things social and
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the Nation." Id. (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
185. Brummond, supra note 22, at 124-26.
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traditional insurance practices.186 While many TPAs, or claims ad-
ministrators, receive a percentage of the claims paid on behalf of a
self-funded benefit plan, neither the plan nor the TPA pays anything
into the state by way of premium tax.187
Fourth, self-funded plans should be required to participate in
comprehensive health acts such as the Minnesota Comprehensive
Health Insurance Act.188 Under St. Paul Electrical Workers Welfare
Fund,189 self-funded plans are exempt from paying into the state
fund. This exemption not only denies the state fund needed monies
but also unjustifiably forces state health maintenance organizations
and insurance companies to bear the entire financial burden for
needy state participants.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Since its enactment, ERISA has successfully controlled abuses
within the pension plan area. However, both Congress and, in turn,
the courts need to address the acknowledged inequities resulting
from the distinction between self-funded and fully-insured benefit
programs. Congress has clearly stated that the primary purpose of
ERISA legislation is to protect and secure the benefits of employees
and plan beneficiaries. While the legislation has succeeded in attain-
186. See Insurance Bd. of Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408 (3d Cir.
1987). In Muir, the appellant self-funded its employee benefit plan but contracted
with Pennsylvania Blue Cross/Blue Shield ("BCBS") for administrative services. Id.
at 409. BCBS made initial claim determinations, issued BCBS insurance cards and
claim forms, and processed plan participant's claims "in accordance with [BCBS's]
regular office procedures." Id.
The Third Circuit reversed the district court and held that, because the em-
ployer remained solely responsible for funding claims payment, BCBS, notwithstand-
ing its use of traditional insurance practices, did not function in the capacity of an
insurer. Rather, it provided administrative services only. Id. at 412; see also Moore v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 786 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1986). In Moore, the em-
ployer established a trust fund to self-fund its employee benefit plan. Id. at 924. The
trust fund contracted with Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company and
adopted the "terms and provisions of a Provident group policy as its own ..... " Id.
Additionally, the trust fund hired a TPA, but Provident "retained the privilege to
review the administrator's determination of the amount of benefits and to defend or
settle any action filed on a claim for benefits under the Plan." Id. In response to a
plan participant's state law action against Provident, the Ninth Circuit held, "Provi-
dent's role . . . was not that of an insurance company but that of an administrative
overseer." Id.
187. See Brummond, supra note 22, at 78 (noting that a distinct advantage, from
the employer's viewpoint, is that self-insured employee benefits plans can usually
avoid state premium taxes); see also Turza & Halloway, supra note 4 1, at 201-02.
188. MINN. STAT. § 62E.01 (1990).
189. St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn.
1980); see also supra notes 151-161 and accompanying text.
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ing this end for pension plans, the means provided by ERISA, in the
area of employee benefit plans, have failed.
Health care costs will continue to soar, and employers will con-
tinue to search for ways to reduce their health care costs. Without
some sort of equitable and uniform standard for all employee benefit
plans to follow, disparity and disuniformity will continue to affect the
general welfare. Whether additional controls come through stricter
federal or state regulatory schemes, one thing is obvious from the
case law: the Court's interpretation of the current legislation, which
distinguishes self-funded and fully-insured benefit plans, fails to pro-
vide uniformity and fairness for plan participants.
Julie K. Swedback
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